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This volume seeks to further the use of formal methods in clarifying one of the central problems of philosophy: that of our free human agency and its place in our indeterministic world. It celebrates the important contributions made in this area by Nuel Belnap, American logician and philosopher. Philosophically, indeterminism and free action can seem far apart, but in Belnap’s work, they are intimately linked. This book explores their philosophical interconnectedness through a selection of original research papers that build forth on Belnap’s logical and philosophical work. Some contributions take the form of critical discussions of Belnap's published work, some develop points made in his publications in new directions, and others provide additional insights on the topics of indeterminism and free action. In Nuel Belnap’s work on indeterminism and free action, three formal frameworks figure prominently: the simple branching histories framework known as "branching time;" its relativistic spatio-temporal extension, branching space-times; and the “seeing to it that” (stit) logic of agency. As those frameworks provide the formal background for the contributed papers, the volume introduction gives an overview of the current state of their development. It also introduces case-intensional first order logic (CIFOL), a general intensional logic offering resources for a first-order extension of the mentioned frameworks and a recent research focus of Belnap’s. The volume also contains an extended biographical interview with Nuel Belnap.

Free will and determinism. --- Philosophy, American --- Belnap, Nuel, --- Belnap, Nuel D.,

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Le « libre arbitre », cette capacité à choisir librement ou encore à déterminer notre propre volonté, semble menacé par les avancées de la psychologie et des neurosciences contemporaines. Or, certaines interrogations philosophiques doivent être résolues avant de tirer les conséquences de ces résultats empiriques : le déterminisme causal, qui est au fondement de toute démarche scientifique, est-il compatible avec la notion de libre arbitre ? Quel type de relation entretiennent l’esprit et le cerveau ? L’examen de ces problèmes fondamentaux constitue le préalable à l’interprétation des données issues des neurosciences, en particulier des expériences de Benjamin Libet qui ont semblé remettre en question l’efficacité causale de nos décisions conscientes. Par ailleurs, il est légitime de se demander si les limites de la conscience et le rapport qu’elle entretient avec les processus inconscients, qu’ils relèvent de l’Inconscient freudien ou de l’ « inconscient cognitif » mis en lumière par les neurosciences, constituent un frein à l’exercice de notre liberté. Cet ouvrage esquisse une solution nouvelle à ces questions. Il montre comment la psychologie et les neurosciences, bien que menaçant la conception traditionnelle du libre arbitre, permettraient de concevoir en leur sein même une redéfinition de cette notion, envisagée comme une capacité relative et non plus absolue, nécessitant un apprentissage.

Determinism (Philosophy) --- Free will and determinism. --- Philosophy and cognitive science. --- Free will and determinism --- Philosophy and cognitive science --- Philosophy & Religion --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science and philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- neuroscience --- libre arbitre --- conscience --- déterminisme

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Das Buch verschafft einen Überblick über die jüngere Willensfreiheitsdebatte, wobei es auch die Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung für das Freiheitsproblem erörtert. Zudem entwickelt der Autor eine eigene, fähigkeitsbasierte Konzeption der Willensfreiheit. Geert Keil argumentiert: Die wohlverstandene Fähigkeit, sich so oder anders zu entscheiden, ist mit den Befunden der empirischen Wissenschaften vereinbar, nicht hingegen mit der metaphysischen Lehre des Determinismus. Die überarbeitete Argumentation der neuen Auflage geht auf Einwände ein und berücksichtigt die neu erschienene Literatur. This book surveys recent debates on freedom of will, incorporating the implications of modern brain research. The author develops an original, capability-based conception of freedom of will. Geert Keil proposes that the well-understood capability for deciding one way or another is reconcilable with the findings of empirical science, but not with the metaphysical doctrine of determinism.

Free will and determinism. --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Determinism. --- Freedom of Will. --- Metaphysics.

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Cet ouvrage collectif constitue le quatrième volume des « Cahiers Castoriadis ». Envisager conjointement la praxis et l'institution conduit au cœur même du travail de Castoriadis, permettant ainsi de le saisir dans sa dimension la plus novatrice, laquelle ne va toutefois pas sans risques. Son originalité tient pour partie à sa capacité à affronter sans fard l'aporie que manifeste le rapprochement de ces deux notions.

Practice (Philosophy) --- Praktijk (Filosofie) --- Pratique (philosophie) --- Praxis (Philosophie) --- Institutions (Philosophy) --- Free will and determinism --- Rationalism --- Self-realization --- Institutions (Philosophie) --- Libre arbitre et déterminisme --- Rationalisme --- Réalisation de soi --- Castoriadis, Cornelius, --- Libre arbitre et déterminisme --- Réalisation de soi --- Castoriadis, Cornelius --- Addresses, essays, lectures --- Criticism and interpretation --- Philosophy --- praxis --- critique --- solidarité --- anthropologie --- pouvoir --- affectivité --- rationalité

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Neuroscientists often consider free will to be an illusion. Contrary to this hypothesis, the contributions to this volume show that recent developments in neuroscience can also support the existence of free will. Firstly, the possibility of intentional consciousness is studied. Secondly, Libet’s experiments are discussed from this new perspective. Thirdly, the relationship between free will, causality and language is analyzed. This approach suggests that language grants the human brain a possibility to articulate a meaningful personal life. Therefore, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.

Free will and determinism. --- Causation. --- Neurosciences. --- Neural sciences --- Neurological sciences --- Neuroscience --- Medical sciences --- Nervous system --- Causality --- Cause and effect --- Effect and cause --- Final cause --- Beginning --- God --- Metaphysics --- Philosophy --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Teleology --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Philosophy of mind